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I. INTRODUCTION
Prompted by the murder of an English tourist in North Florida in late
1993' and its longstanding unhappiness with the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services' ("HRS") efforts to carry out its juvenile justice
responsibilities, the Florida Legislature enacted a statute creating a new
Department of Juvenile Justice.2 The legislature also amended chapter 39
of Florida's Juvenile Code by expanding the contempt powers of the court;3
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, FL. The author thanks Elizabeth Zsakany and Marlo Powell-Robinson for their
assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Linda Kleindienst et al., English TouristSlain Woman Hurt; 3 Sought, SUN-SENTINEL,
Oct. 23, 1993, at A14; Bill Moss & Lucy Morgan, State Moves to Stop Killings, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1993, at Al; Pain Is Still Sharp for Slain Tourist's Lover the
Past Year Has Been a Nightmare for Margaret Jagger of Britain, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug.
21, 1994, at B 1; John C. Van Gieson, Death Penalty to be Sought for Youths in Tourist
Killing, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 1993, at A14.
2. All powers were transferred to the Department from HRS, effective October 1, 1994.
Act effective May 18, 1994, ch. 94-209, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 1183, 1192-94 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 20.316).
3. See id. § 14, at 1245-47 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.0145).
1
Dale: Juvenile Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
expanding prehearing detention criteria;4 expanding the courts' power to
hold parents responsible for delinquent acts of their children;5 lowering the
age for transfer of children for prosecution as an adult;6 creating additional
commitment programs (specifically boot camps);7 changing the provisions
concerning publication of juvenile records;8 and establishing a new Juvenile
Justice Advisory Board.9 These substantial changes follow on the heels of
a massive rewriting of the Juvenile Code which went into effect in 1990.
During the Spring 1994 session, the legislature also changed several
significant provisions governing child welfare. Specifically, the legislature
amended part IV of chapter 39, concerning placement plans and permanency
planning, to create more precise documentation for reunification or
termination of parental rights.
At the same time, the supreme court and district courts of appeal were
active in deciding issues in both the delinquency and child welfare areas.
The appellate courts' tradition of holding the trial courts accountable for
strict compliance with the provisions of chapter 39 continues unabated. The
cases surveyed in this review cover the twelve month period from Septem-
ber 1, 1993, to August 31, 1994.
II. DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Since 1990, the law has required that an order adjudicating a child
dependent in Florida must state the facts upon which the finding of
dependency is made." Yet, the trial courts continually fail to comply with
this simple provision despite the decisions of In re T.S." and Williams v.
HRS,12 both of which were decided nearly four years ago. The same issue
regarding dependency findings was before the appellate courts three times
this past year, and in each case the failure of the trial court to properly
4. See id. § 31, at 1275-80 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.044 (1993)).
5. See id. § 39, at 1289-90 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.049 (1993)).
6. See, e.g., id. § 11, at 1237-40 (defining a "serious or habitual offender" as a child no
less than 14 years old).
7. See ch. 94-209, § 48, Fla. Laws at 1300 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.0584).
8. See id. § 33, at 1280-82 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.045 (1993)).
9. See id. § 4, at 1196-97.
10. See FLA. STAT. § 39.409(3) (1991).
11. 557 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
12. 568 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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adjudicate warranted reversal or remand. 3 It is hard to determine why this
rudimentary failure to comply with the statute continues to occur. Perhaps
stronger appellate supervision is needed.
According to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, evidence of a
parent's actions subsequent to a child's placement into HRS custody is
admissible for various purposes. In In re A.L.O.,14 the issue was the
admissibility of evidence offered to prove dependency after the children had
been placed into the custody of HRS. Upon discovering that the parent had
not been informed of the right to counsel prior to an initial dependency
adjudication, HRS amended its petitions for dependency and for termination
of parental rights by adding the new evidence. Relying on Belflower v.
HRS5 and HRS v. Zeigler,6 the court held that evidence related to the
best interests of the child is admissible even if it involves action subsequent
to the child's placement into HRS's custody. 7 The courts in Belfiower and
Zeigler recognized that the parents' rights could be protected, although
evidence of subsequent dependency behavior is admitted. Furthermore, a
parent's subsequent actions may be considered evidence of continuing
abandonment or neglect under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.310.
The court concluded that while parental rights may not be terminated based
upon defective dependency proceedings, the child's right to a safe and
healthy environment should not be put at risk for the same reasons.' 8
Incarceration of a parent is not an uncommon problem at the adjudica-
tion stages of dependency proceedings. In re C.M 9 raised the issue of
how the courts should handle the incarceration of the parent in terms of due
process rights. In C.M, a mother appealed from an order adjudicating her
child dependent. The basis for the petition was that the mother failed to
provide a stable environment due to her repeated incarceration. The mother
was not present at the adjudicatory hearing because she was incarcerated.
However, she was represented by counsel. Her lawyer orally stipulated to
dependency, stating that the mother authorized the stipulations and was
aware of the ramifications of a finding of dependency by the court. An
13. Anderson v. HRS, 635 So. 2d 162, 162 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Ware v.
J.N.M., 632 So. 2d 716, 717 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); In re M.P., 632 So. 2d 1051,
1051 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Gelrod v. HRS, 629 So. 2d 251, 251 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct
App. 1993).
14. 637 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1994).
15. 578 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
16. 587 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
17. A.L.O., 637 So. 2d at 16.
18. Id. at 17.
19. 632 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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order of adjudication followed. At a subsequent dispositional hearing, the
mother was present, but the court did not take the opportunity to inquire
whether the stipulation was knowingly and made voluntarily. The appellate
court reversed, applying Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.325(c), which
provides that the court shall determine whether any admission or consent to
a finding of dependency is made voluntarily and with a full understanding
of the nature of the allegations and the possible consequences of the
admission or consent.20 Mere presence at the dispositional hearing was not
enough to establish that the stipulation had been knowingly and voluntarily
made.
Publicity in dependency proceedings is an ongoing problem in
Florida.2 In Times Publishing Co. v. A.J.,22 the Florida Supreme Court
dealt with application of the public records law in the context of a
dependency proceeding. In that case, the St. Petersburg Times filed a public
records request for sheriff's department documents related to allegations of
abuse or neglect at the Church of Scientology's Cadet School. The
corporation operating the school filed an ex parte emergency motion to
impose confidentiality. The motion was premised upon an exemption from
public records disclosure concerning reports of child neglect or abuse under
Florida law.23 The supreme court held that the non-custodian of the public
records had standing to assert the statutory exception, provided the nonparty
was a member of a class the exception was intended to protect.24  The
court also held that the children had standing as well, and thus the court had
the power to impose a permanent injunction barring release of the public
records in question.25
The Florida courts have been quite specific about who may commence
dependency proceedings. Included are all "interested persons" and
20. Id. at 1094. Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.325(c) provides:
The parent or custodian may admit or consent to a finding of dependency. The
court shall determine that any admission or consent to a finding of dependency
is made voluntarily and with a full understanding of the nature of the allegations
and the possible consequences of such admission or consent, and that the parent
or custodian has been advised of the right to be represented by counsel.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.325(c).
21. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1993 Leading Cases and Significant Develop-
ments in Florida Law, 18 NOVA L. REV. 541, 543 (1993); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law:
1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV. 333, 360 (1991).
22. 626 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 1993).
23. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.411(4), 119.07(3)(a), 415.51(I)(a) (Supp. 1990).
24. Times Publishing Co., 626 So. 2d at 1315.
25. Id.
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guardians ad litem.26 Recently, however, the First District Court of Appeal
was faced with the question of limitations on the right to intervene in a
dependency proceeding. In In re S.S.J.," an organization known as
Valuing our Children and Laws ("VOCAL") of Jacksonville, Inc. sought to
intervene in a dependency proceeding allegedly at the request of the subject
child's natural father. VOCAL asked the trial court to order the mother to
submit to involuntary birth control. The appellate court held that chapter 39
provisions concerning parties to a dependency proceeding did not control
intervention." Rather, the generic test for intervention in a civil case, as
governed by Florida case law, provides that the interest must be in the
matter in litigation and of such a direct and immediate character that the
intervenor would either gain or lose by the legal operational effect of the
judgment. The appellate court concluded that VOCAL failed to demonstrate
this degree of interest in the case.29
Another ongoing issue is the power ofjuvenile courts to oversee HRS's
handling of dependency cases. For example, the appellate courts have
regularly limited the power of the trial courts to order HRS to pay for a
variety of services in dependency proceedings. The appellate courts have
relied upon the juvenile courts' lack of explicit legislative authority to act
and the lack of any constitutional right in a party on the basis of which the
juvenile court would be required to act. In HRS v. Ortiz,30 HRS appealed
an order requiring it to pay the cost of a psychological evaluation of the
mother of an allegedly dependant infant. The court held that in the absence
of legislative authorization or a demonstration that the recipient has a
constitutional right to the service, HRS cannot be required to pay for the
service.3' In HRS v. Jones,32 the Fifth District Court of Appeal followed
its holding in Ortiz.33 The sole distinction was that the order appealed
from in Jones required HRS to pay for an intelligence evaluation of a
natural mother in a dependency proceeding. 4
26. See Dale, 1993 Leading Cases and Developments, supra note 21, at 546; Michael
J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 NOVA L. REv. 1169, 1197-98
(1991).
27. 634 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
28. Id. at 199.
29. Id.
30. 627 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
31. Id.
32. 631 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
33. Id. at 349.
34. Id.
Dale
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B. Right to Counsel Issues
As reported in prior surveys, neither the United States Supreme Court
nor the Florida Supreme Court has ever ruled that a parent has an absolute
right to counsel in a dependency proceeding.35 In Florida, counsel is not
mandatory in a dependency proceeding if the parent is indigent.36
However, the parent must be notified of the right to counsel in such a
proceeding. Furthermore, in a limited context where termination of parental
rights is subsequently likely to occur, the parent is entitled to counsel free
of charge at the dependency proceeding.37
The two-part rule under Florida law-that a parent is not entitled to a
free lawyer in a dependency proceeding but must be notified of his or her
right to counsel, and if termination is likely, that a free lawyer shall be
appointed-has generated a substantial body of appellate cases which
reversed trial courts for failure to comply.3" The solution is simply to
amend the statute and provide free counsel to parents in dependency
proceedings, as is done in other states.39
The inadequacy of the Florida statute and the inability of the courts to
comply with the current standard is best evidenced in Palmateer v. HRS.4"
In that case, the trial court advised the parents of their right to counsel by
stating that the parents had "the right to have an attorney, and the right to
have an attorney appointed for you if you cannot afford one. If I see your
case in that posture I will advise you. Are there any questions?" ' The
appellate court held that this explanation violated Florida Rule of Juvenile
Procedure 8.320(a).42 The rule unequivocally states that courts shall advise
35. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Davis v. Page,
714 F.2d 512, 515-18 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1052 (1984); Dale, 1991 Survey,
supra note 21, at 355-56; Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note 26, at 1188-90; cf FLA. STAT. §
39.406; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320.
36. See Davis, 714 F.2d at 515-18; Dale, 1991 Survey, supra note 21, at 355.
37. See supra note 36.
38. See, e.g., In re J.B., 624 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
39. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-63 (1994); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(e)(2)
(West 1994); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(2)(e) (McKinney 1994); see also GA. CODE
ANN. § 15-11-30 (1994) (pertaining to juvenile delinquency proceedings).
40. 625 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
41. Id. at 118.
42. Id. Rule 8.320(a) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedures provides:
(a) Duty of the Court
(1) At each stage of the dependency proceeding the court shall advise the
parent, guardian, or custodian of the right to have counsel present.
Vol. 19
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a parent of the right to counsel at each stage of the dependency proceed-
ing.43 Upon request, the court shall appoint counsel to an insolvent parent
if the parent is entitled by law. The court shall further determine whether
the right to counsel is understood. The appellate court vacated the trial
court's ruling and remanded."
In In re 4.L.O., 45 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reasserted the
doctrine that while a dependency adjudication may be void by failure to
advise a parent of the right to counsel, it is not void ab initio.46  Thus,
failure to appeal will leave the adjudication of dependency standing,
although it is defective as a basis for termination of parental rights.
Therefore, the trial court may look at the finding of dependency in making
a decision to retain custody with HRS as opposed to placing the child back
with the parent. In A.L.O., the appellate court made a decision that
protected the child. However, if there had been an absolute statutory right
to counsel at the dependency stage as this survey suggests, the entire issue
would never have arisen.
The distinction between providing counsel free of charge when
termination of parental rights is likely and when it is not, invites both
confusion and appeal. These are further reasons why the Florida law should
be changed. A recent case exemplifying the problem is In re D.F.47 In
that case, a father appealed a trial court's order of dependency due to
"egregious emotional abuse." 8 The appellate court held that under Florida
case law, not only must a parent be informed of the right to counsel at each
stage of the dependency proceeding, but presence of counsel will be
(2) The court may and upon request shall appoint counsel to insolvent
persons who are so entitled as provided by law.
(3) The court shall ascertain whether the right to counsel is understood.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320(a).
43. Id.
44. Palmateer, 625 So. 2d at 118.
45. 637 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
46. See Belfiower, 578 So. 2d at 828-29 (establishing the proposition that a dependency
adjudication is not void ab initio).
47. 622 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
48. Section 39.464(4) of the Florida Statutes defines "egregious conduct" and provides
in pertinent part:
The parent or parents have engaged in egregious conduct that endangers the life,
health, or safety of the child or sibling, or the parents have had the opportunity
and capability to prevent egregious conduct that threatened the life, health, or
safety of the child or sibling and have knowingly failed to do so.
FLA. STAT. § 39.464(4) (1993).
Dale
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required where permanent termination of parental rights might result.4 9
The First District Court of Appeal recognized that Rule 8.330(a) of the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides that the court has the option
of sustaining dependency by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has
committed egregious abuse." Moreover, such a finding may suffice to
support the termination of parental rights at the subsequent termination
proceeding." Therefore, the court held that whenever egregious abuse is
alleged as a basis for a petition for dependency, the parents should be
specifically placed on notice that facts have been alleged which, if found by
clear and convincing evidence, would serve as partial grounds for termina-
tion of parental rights. Further, the petition itself must apprise the parents
of the right to counsel and, if indigent, the right to court appointed
counsel.52
Other recent appellate cases amplify the inadequacy of the Florida law
in this area. In D.JM v. HRS,53 the trial court not only failed to adequate-
ly advise the parent of the right to counsel, but also failed to determine
whether the parent fully understood the right in the first place. In In re
MJ.S.,54 there was no evidence that the parent was informed of the right
to counsel at all. In Adoption Centre, Inc. v. Marshall,5 the trial court
error was even more basic. In that case, the appellate court held that the
trial court judge abused his discretion by denying one of the parties' request
for a continuance. 6 The purpose of the continuance was to secure a
lawyer to assist in the presentation of evidence and witnesses in the pending
proceeding for dependency and termination of parental rights. 7
Thus, it seems clear that the legislature ought to simply redraft chapter
39 to provide the absolute right to counsel free of charge for indigent
parents in both dependency, as well as termination of parental rights cases.
There are, of course, financial considerations in enacting such a statute. For
example, attorneys must be paid to represent indigent parents. However, it
remains to be seen how costly a change would be, given such considerations
as the appellate costs and resulting disruptions to parties' lives under the
49. D.F., 622 So. 2d at 1105.
50. Id. at 1104.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1104-05.
53. 634 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
54. 631 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
55. 627 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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current rule, the limits already set on attorneys' fees,5" and the practice in
some circuits of routinely appointing counsel in these cases.59
However, there are instances where the statutory provision of counsel
may not be enough. In In re D.M W.," the issue on appeal was whether,
in a termination of parental rights case, a father's due process rights were
violated by HRS's failure to notify his attorney when the department secured
the father's surrender of his parental rights. Without citation to any case
law, the appellate court upheld the termination, based upon the best interests
of the child.' The child had been living with his new adoptive parents for
approximately three and one half years while both proceedings in the lower
court and on appeal continued. 2 The appellate court stated that it was
deeply troubled by what HRS had done.63 The court recognized that the
father was represented by counsel at the time he executed the surrender, but
had failed to notify counsel regarding the surrender.' HRS did not
suggest to the father that he seek the benefit of talking to his lawyer before
executing the surrender.6 ' The court held that this "resulted in a lack of
meaningful assistance of counsel," but upheld the termination by stating that
"HRS may not have violated the letter of the law in circumventing the
statutory right to counsel by failing to file the petition for termination of
parental rights until after it secured Mr. Menendez's permanent surrender of
parental rights. 66 This statement is without citation. Perhaps recognizing
the inadequacy of its analysis, the court then commented that it did feel that
HRS violated "the spirit of the law."' 7 However, this rationale is patently
inadequate, if not completely erroneous. First, the right to counsel provision
of the Florida law in termination proceedings is clear and absolute. There
must be a showing to the court of a knowing and intelligent waiver of
counsel. However, in this case, there was none. Second, a line of United
58. Interview with Daniella Levine, Esq., HRS Counsel, in Fort Lauderdale, FL (Mar.
15, 1994).
59. See Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987).
60. 623 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
61. Id. at 635.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 636.
65. D.M.W., 623 So. 2d at 636.
66. Id.
67. Id.
Dale
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States Supreme Court cases, commencing with Stanley v. Illinois,68
recognizes both the procedural and substantive due process rights of parents
in dependency related proceedings. Yet, the appellate court never addressed
these issues.
C. Abuse Reporting Issues
Florida, like most states,69 mandates the reporting of abuse and
neglect.70 Among other things, the Florida statute provides for what shall
be reported, a central abuse registry and tracking system, due process
protections for alleged perpetrators, and a list of who must report.7
Cases involving interpretation of the abuse reporting statute regularly
come before the appellate courts. 2 Recently, in R.S.M v. HRS,73 a father
appealed the denial of his request to expunge his name from the Central
Child Abuse Registry. Under the facts of the case, the appellate court
concluded that the mere presence of bruises resulting from corporal
punishment is not competent, substantial evidence of the excessive corporal
punishment or temporary disfigurement standards which the legislature
envisioned when it passed chapter 415, the controlling statute. 74
D. Termination of Parental Rights Issues
Application of the language within part VI of chapter 39, which
governs the grounds for terminating parental rights, has generated a
substantial body of case law over the years." In the fall of 1993, the
6.8. 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
69. See REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, $ 4.02[2], at 4-12 (Mark I. Soler, exec. dir.
1994).
70. FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (1993).
71. Id. § 415.103.
72. See Dale, 1993 Leading Cases and Developments, supra note 21, at 551; Dale, 1991
Survey, supra note 21, at 366.
73. 640 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
74. Id. at 1126-27 (relying upon B.R. v. HRS, 558 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989)).
75. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV.
335, 375-83 (1992); Dale, 1991 Survey, supra note 21, at 368-74; Dale, 1990 Survey, supra
note 26, at 1199-1208; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1989 Survey of Florida Law, 14
NOVA L. REV. 859, 893-900 (1990); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1988 Survey of Florida
Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1159, 1185-90 (1989).
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Second District Court of Appeal recognized in In re F.A.C.76 that "[c]hap-
ter 39 is not well written [and] it is no wonder that litigants and trial judges
alike are confused in attempting to determine the requirements to terminate
parental rights."'  Fortunately, in the spring of 1994, the legislature re-
wrote part VI in an effort to clarify the grounds for termination. The
legislature substantially reworded section 39.464, which governs grounds for
termination of parental rights." It articulated four grounds: 1) execution
of a voluntary surrender of the child; 2) when identity or location of the
parent is unknown and cannot be ascertained; 3) conduct toward the child
or other children which demonstrates that continued involvement of the
parent threatens the life or well being of the child irrespective of the
provision of services; 4) the parent is engaged in egregious conduct that
endangers the life, health, or safety of the child or the child's siblings; and
5) the parent had the opportunity and capability to prevent such egregious
conduct and failed to do so." Section 39.467 of the Florida Statutes,
governing the adjudicatory hearing in termination cases, was substantially
shortened and now simply obligates the court to consider the specific
elements set forth for the termination of parental rights.8" The court must
also determine that each element is established by clear and convincing
evidence before granting the petition. The clear and convincing standard is
required by the United States Supreme Court decision in Santosky v.
Kramer.
1
Finally, the legislature enacted section 39.4611, entitled "Elements of
Petition for Termination of Parental Rights."82 This section requires that
at least one of the four grounds set forth in section 39.464 must be met.8
It further requires that the parents are advised of their right to counsel at all
hearings they attend; that a dispositional order adjudicating a child
dependent was entered in any prior dependency proceeding relied upon in
offering the parent a case plan; and that the manifest best interests of the
child would be served by the granting of the petition to terminate parental
76. 625 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 623 (Fla.
1994).
77. Id. at 910.
78. Act of May 12, 1994, ch. 94-164, § 35, 1994 Fla. Laws 963, 1007 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 39.464 (1993)).
79. Id.
80. Id. § 38, at 1009-11 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.467 (1993)).
81. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
82. Ch. 94-164, § 30, 1994 Fla. Laws at 1003 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.4611).
83. Id.
Dale
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rights.8 4 The new statutory provision also provides that "a separate petition
for dependency need not be filed and the department need not offer the
parents a case plan with the goal of reunification, but may instead file with
the court a case plan with a goal of termination of parental rights." 5 The
fact that the child was adjudicated dependent previously may be proved by
the introduction of either a certified copy of the order of adjudication or the
order of disposition of dependency.86 Similarly, the fact that the parent
was notified of the right to counsel in a prior proceeding for dependency
may be proved by the introduction of a certified copy of the order of
adjudication or disposition." At first glance, the rewriting appears to
clarify the situation and will reduce appellate supervision in this area.
III. DELINQUENCY
A. Trial Issues
The appropriate use of secure detention in delinquency cases has been
before both the legislature and the state courts on numerous occasions in the
past.8 The issue reached the Florida Supreme Court again this year in
R. W. v. Soud.89 In that case, a juvenile petitioned the supreme court for
a writ of habeas corpus based upon the child's placement in secure detention
by the circuit court pending disposition in order that the child be available
for the preparation of a predispositional report ("PDR"). The trial court
concluded that the chapter 39 provisions relating to detention which prohibit
detention for the purpose of insuring access to juveniles are inapplicable
after a juvenile pleads guilty to an offense and the child is placed into
secure detention pending the dispositional hearing.9" Although R.W. had
been released, the supreme court issued its decision because the matter was
of great importance. The supreme court ultimately ruled that the statutory
requirements for secure detention contained in section 39.042 of the Florida
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Ch. 94-164, § 30, at 1003.
88. A.A. v. Rolle, 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992); Dale, 1992 Survey, supra note 75, at 342-
65; Dale, 1993 Leading Cases and Developments, supra note 21, at 552-58; Dale, 1991
Survey, supra note 21, at 335-55; Dale, 1990 Survey,supra note 26, at 1171-88; Dale, 1989
Survey, supra note 75, at 861-83; Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 75, at 1161-70; Fred Grimm,
Video Justice is Yet Another Unsettling Blip, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 25, 1994, at BRI.
89. 639 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1994).
90. Id. at 26.
Vol. 19
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 7
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/7
1994]
Statutes apply to a child who is awaiting disposition.9' Thus, the trial
court was obligated, but failed to conduct a risk assessment as required by
law and made no findings.
The court also concluded that when a child is on release status and has
not been previously detained, he or she may only be placed into detention
after a court hearing in which the original risk assessment instrument was
rescored based on newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances.92
There was no evidence that a risk assessment instrument was ever completed
in this case. Nor was there any evidence of rescoring by the judge. The
court next held that Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.110(g) contem-
plates detention pending disposition but does not eliminate the statutory
requirements that findings be made and a risk assessment be performed
before the child is placed into detention. 3
Finally, the supreme court explicitly disapproved the earlier district
court of appeal decision in H.L. v. Woolsey."4 The H.L. court had
concluded that section 39.044(5) of the Florida Statutes provided authority
to detain a juvenile pending a dispositional hearing without the statutory
procedures described here." The supreme court rejected that proposi-
tion. Justices Overton and McDonald dissented, finding language in
section 39.042 gave flexibility to the trial judge.97 The dissenting justices
also found that the legislature should address the issue.98
The use of closed circuit television for detention hearings in adult
criminal cases has become widespread across the country.99 Its use has
now been suggested in Florida at juvenile detention hearings. As a result
of an emergency petition by Broward County Juvenile Court judges in the
91. Id. at 26-27.
92. Id. at 27.
93. Id.
94. 618 So. 2d 268 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), disapproved, R. W., 639 So. 2d at 25.
95. Id. at 269.
96. R.W, 639 So. 2d at 27.
97. Id. at 28 (Overton & McDonald, JJ., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Robert Anderson et al., The Impact of Information Technology on Judicial
Administration: A ResearchAgendafor the Future, 66 S. CAL. L. REv' 1761 (1993); Mark
P. Brewster et al., An Overview of the Texas Bar Foundation Symposium on Cost Control At
the Courthouse Held September 30, 1987, Corpus Christi, Texas, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 507
(1987); Pat Raburn-Remfry, Expediting Arrest Processing, 2 CORNELL L.J. & PUB. POL'Y
121 (1992); Jeffrey M. Silbert et al., The Use of Closed Circuit Television for Conducting
Misdemeanor Arraignments in Dade County, Florida, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 657 (1984);
Ronnie Thaxton, Injustice Telecast: The Illegal Use of Closed-Circuit Television Arraign-
ments and Bail Bond Hearings in Federal Court, 79 IowA L. REv. 175 (1993).
Dale
13
Dale: Juvenile Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit seeking amendment to Florida Rule of Juvenile
Procedure 8.100(a), the supreme court has asked for comment.' The
court's request for comment as a precursor to amending the Rules of
Juvenile Procedure to permit electronic audiovisual detention hearings comes
on the heels of the court of appeal's decision in R.R. v. Portesy.' ' In that
case, the First District Court of Appeal held that video telephone detention
hearings were impermissible in juvenile delinquency cases because the
procedure had not been authorized by rule or statute.' 2 In R.R., a
juvenile had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity
of a secure detention order which had been issued as a result of a video
telephone hearing as opposed to the child's presence in the courtroom. The
court noted that the supreme court had not authorized the procedure as a
pilot project. Nor had there been any critical review accorded by the
supreme court's rule making process. 3
The responsibility to charge children with acts of juvenile delinquency,
like charging adults with criminal offenses, rests with the prosecuting
attorney. The courts are not permitted to interfere in this process. In State
v. Everett,"4 the appellate court held that the adult court lacked the
authority to grant a motion to transfer a case back to the juvenile division
under the facts of the case. 05 The state had initially moved to transfer
from juvenile to adult court. The juvenile division denied the motion, and
thereafter the state direct-filed an information in the criminal division. The
appellate court held that "[t]he state attorney is not precluded from direct-
filing an information [in adult court] despite initially filing a delinquency
petition. ' '
Furthermore, the juvenile court may not interfere with the filing
responsibilities of a prosecuting attorney by sua sponte dismissing actions.
In State v. E.N., °7 the state appealed a dispositional order in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding on the ground that the trial court impermissibly
permitted the child to plead to an uncharged offense. The appellate court
recognized that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a juvenile
100. See In re Amendment to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a), No. 84,021
(Fla. July 19, 1994).
101. 629 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 637 So. 2d 236 (Fla.
1994).
102. Id. at 1062.
103. Id. at 1063.
104. 624 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
105. Id. at 854.
106. Id.
107. 624 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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delinquent based on an uncharged offense."° The court explained that
while the trial court has latitude and discretion in post-trial proceedings, the
state attorney is solely responsible to render a pretrial decision whether to
prosecute or to enter a nolle prosequi.0 9 Similarly, in State v. KL.,"O
the court held that once the prosecutor decides that a particular case will be
prosecuted, the responsibility of the trial court is to adjudicate only those
issues properly placed before the court."' In KL., the trial court had
dismissed the case sua sponte after a petition had been filed but no motion
to dismiss had been made by the juvenile under the Florida Rule of Juvenile
Procedure 8.085.12 The appeals court thus reversed the dismissal."'
B. Dispositional Issues
Chapter 39 provides for a number of dispositional alternatives including
restitution, community control, and commitment to a variety of facilities
characterized at least in part by increasing degrees of deprivation of
liberty. 14 In addition, when a juvenile is tried as an adult, Florida law
provides that he or she may nonetheless receive a disposition in the juvenile
corrections system if the court so finds based upon a statutorily defined
test."
5
In J.MG. v. State,"6 the appellate court was faced again with the
issue of the proper use of the restitution statute which provides that the court
may order a child to make restitution for any loss or damage caused by the
child's offense." 7 The court held, as had other courts of appeal on
various occasions,"' that "there must be a causal or significant relation-
ship between the offense for which the child was adjudicated delinquent and
the amount of damages or loss directed to be reimbursed to the victim."" 9
108. Id. at 807.
109. Id.
110. 626 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id
114. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054 (1993); Dale, 1991 Survey, supra note 21, at 348-52
(1991) (discussing the statute and prior case law); Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note 26, at
1181-87.
115. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.059 (1993).
116. 629 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
117. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)() (1991).
118. Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note 26, at 1183; Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 75, at
874-75.
119. J.M.G., 629 So. 2d at 1082.
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Where there is no relationship between the criminal act and the damage, the
restitution order is improper. 2 If the restitution order was part of a
negotiated plea, then the defendant may not argue on appeal that the order
was impermissible. 2 ' In the case at bar, it was not clear from the record
exactly what role restitution played in the plea agreement. Therefore, the
appeals court remanded for further determination.'
Community control is another dispositional alternative. In a one
paragraph opinion, the court in A. W. v. State' reversed that portion of a
trial court order which required the mother of the delinquent child to
perform community service, finding no authority for such an order in
chapter 39.124
In D. VS. v. State,"25 the question before the court was whether an
order placing a child on community control after a withholding of adjudica-
tion could exceed the maximum period of incarceration for an adult on the
same charge. The court held that the child could be ordered to a term of
community control beyond that to which an adult could be sentenced
because, in the case at bar, the youngster was not an adjudicated delinquent
child.'26 The court noted that chapter 39 provides that any commitment
of a delinquent child to the department may not exceed the maximum period
of imprisonment for an adult. 127 Further, a program of community control
ordered by the court may not exceed the term for which a sentence could
be imposed if the child were committed to HRS for the offense. 2 '
However, because this latter section applies only to adjudicated delinquent
children and the other provision only applies to committed children, they are
inapplicable and a period beyond that which may apply for an adult is
appropriate.129
In A.S. v. State, 30 the Fourth District Court of Appeal was faced with
a bizarre order from the trial court which required the appellant's mother to
pay $2500 of the total $4986.60 restitution ordered as a result of a school
yard fight in which the victim suffered a broken nose. Section 39.054(1)(f)
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1082-83.
122. Id. at 1083.
123. 634 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
124. Id. at 1136.
125. 632 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
126. Id. at 222.
127. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(4) (1991).
128. Id. § 39.054(I)(a)(1).
129. D.VS., 632 So. 2d at 222.
130. 627 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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of the Florida Statutes provides that the parent may be ordered to make
restitution for damages caused by the child. 3 ' However, liability should
not exceed $2500 for any one criminal episode and the court must make a
finding after a hearing that the parent failed to make diligent efforts to
prevent the child from engaging in delinquent acts.'32 Otherwise, the
parent is absolved of liability for restitution. 33 In the case at bar, the only
testimony on the record was that of the mother, effectively stating that she
had made diligent efforts. The court conceded that the trial court could
have chosen not to believe the mother's testimony. 34  However, the
argument on appeal by the state was that the mother 'had the burden to
establish a degree of effort above and beyond normal parenting tasks to
establish her diligence by the greater weight of the evidence.""1 35  The
court rejected this "strict liability" argument. 36 The mother's liability for
restitution was reversed. 37
In addition to providing for a number of dispositional alternatives,
including restitution, Florida law provides that the juvenile court may
impose a fifty dollar fee in juvenile cases for the Crimes Compensation
Trust Fund.' 38 In .A. v. State,139 the court was asked to reconcile the
apparent inconsistency between section 960.20 of the Florida Statutes which
authorizes imposition of a fifty dollar fee and section 39.073 which prohibits
the imposition of costs against juveniles in chapter 39 proceedings. 40
Applying the statutory construction rule that later statutes are favored over
earlier ones which are then repealed by implication, the court upheld the
fifty dollar fee so long as the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent.' 4' The
court struck the fee assessed against the juvenile whose adjudication was
withheld. 42
Prior surveys have reviewed the ongoing inability of the trial courts to
make specific written findings with reasons for the imposition of an adult
sentence rather than ajuvenile sentence provided by section 39.059(7)(b) of
131. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(f) (1991).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. A.S., 627 So. 2d at 1266.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. FLA. STAT. § 960.20 (1993).
139. 633 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 109.
142. Id.
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the Florida Statutes. 14 The statutory provision recently came before the
supreme court in Troutman v. State. 44 The issue was whether the trial
court must consider each of the statutory criteria required under sections
39.059(7)(c) and (d) at the time of sentencing of the juvenile as an adult,
and, if so, whether the resultant findings at the time of sentencing must be
contemporaneously reduced to writing. 45 In Troutman, a sixteen year old
charged with kidnapping to facilitate a felony, grand theft of an automobile,
and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, pleaded nolo contendere to
charges of false imprisonment and grand theft. The predisposition report
recommended sentencing as ajuvenile and placement on community control.
The trial court found the recommended sanctions inadequate despite the fact
that the youngster had no prior record. 46  The court announced its
intention to treat the juvenile as an adult, withheld adjudication of guilt, and
sentenced the child to three years of probation.1 47  A written order ex-
plaining the rationale was filed three days later.'4  The Florida Supreme
Court reversed, and held that the suitability or nonsuitability for adult
sanctions must be considered using the enumerated statutory criteria before
the determination of disposition.149 This is true both in cases where the
child is waived into adult court and where the direct-filing provision of
Florida law applies. 5  The court concluded that a trial court must
consider each of the criteria and give an individualized evaluation of how
a particular juvenile fits within the criteria. 5 ' Mere conclusory language
is insufficient.'52 Furthermore, the court held that the written findings and
reasons must be provided at the time of sentencing.'53
143. See Dale, 1993 Leading Cases and Developments, supra note 21, at 558.
144. 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993); cf Smith v. State, 638 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (applying Troutman); Clayton v. State, 636 So. 2d 596 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
145. Troutman, 630 So. 2d at 530.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 532.
150. Troutman, 630 So. 2d at 531.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 532; see also State v. Veach, 630 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1994) (required statutory
findings are necessary prior to imposing adult sanctions upon ajuvenile); Bryan v. State, 638
So. 2d 608 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding post-Troutman, that a transcript does not
satisfy requirement that the findings be in writing); McCoy v. State, 632 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (individual evaluation according to statutory criteria is necessary before
considering adult sanctions); Glidewell v. State, 630 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
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C. Appellate Issues
In two cases, State v. F.G.15 4 and State v. MG.,155 the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal was faced with the question of whether a claimed
procedural error leading to the entry of a final disposition order in ajuvenile
delinquency case renders the disposition "illegal" for purposes of the state's
appeal under chapter 39. The appellate court held that the order was not
appealable and certified the question to the supreme court.'56 The under-
lying claimed error was the failure of the trial court to order a predisposition
report as required by section 39.052(3) of the Florida Statutes. The state
had argued that the trial court should have deferred ruling pending receipt
of the report and should have scheduled a dispositional hearing thereafter in
order to dispose of the case.'57 Finding that the order was not illegal-the
dispositions were within the authority of the trial court to make under
chapter 39-the court of appeal dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction
in both cases. 5
The proper role of HRS (now the Department of Juvenile Justice)159
in challenging illegal orders of the juvenile court recently came before the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in HRS v. B.S. 160 In that case, HRS sought
certiorari review of an order adjudicating a minor delinquent for violating
community control and detaining him pending disposition.16' The child's
community control terminated after a successful period of supervision but
the court did not relinquish jurisdiction. The court unilaterally and without
taking any evidence sua sponte reinstated the community control after
receiving a letter from the minor's mother. The child waived counsel and
plead guilty to violating community control. HRS brought the writ,
claiming that the child's due process rights were violated by the court's
order. The appellate court did not reach the merits of the case because HRS
did not represent the minor. The minor neither appealed nor sought release
by habeas corpus. The court of appeal held that this case was similar to
1993) (written findings required when imposing adult sanctions on a child).
154. 630 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), approved, 638 So. 2d 515 (Fla.
1994).
155. 630 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
156. F.G., 630 So. 2d at 583.
157. Id. at 582.
158. Id. at 583; M.G., 630 So. 2d at 585.
159. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
160. 640 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
161. Id. at 1175.
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HRS v. State'6 2 where HRS had sought certiorari review of detention
orders arguing that the risk assessment instrument in each case did not call
for detention. 63 The B.S. court said HRS did not have standing by
certiorari to challenge the orders."6 The court then distinguished another
series of cases where it noted HRS's duties as legal custodian of minors
committed for placement were adversely effected by the orders being
appealed.' 65  In an interesting concurrence, Judge Thompson wrote
specially to describe what the trial judge did as egregious and resulting in
unlawful detention and added that a writ of prohibition would have been the
proper device for HRS to employ.'66 Judge Thompson noted first that
there was no basis for a violation of community control.'67 The court had
no jurisdiction over the child. Second, the detention was ordered without
a legally factual basis having been established as is required by the Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure. 6 ' The juvenile court was neither presented
with an affidavit nor did it take sworn testimony prior to issuing the custody
order.'69
What is troubling about this decision as illuminated in Judge Thomp-
son's concurrence, is that the appellate court simply did not treat this writ
as one for prohibition. The Florida courts regularly reframe appeals or writs
so that they are procedurally correct. 70
IV. CONCLUSION
This past spring, the Florida Legislature made changes in the delin-
quency statute in an effort to get tougher on juveniles. Whether the
changes, based at least in part on a notorious tourist murder in North
Florida, will have the desired effect remains to be seen. In the child welfare
area, the legislature made changes which, hopefully, will clarify some
confusion in the appellate courts in the termination of parental rights area.
162. 599 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 606 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.
1992).
163. B.S., 640 So. 2d at 1175 (citing HRS v. State, 599 So. 2d at 127).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1176 (Thompson, J., concurring).
167. Id.
168. B.S., 640 So. 2d at 1177.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., HRS v. Schreiber, 561 So. 2d 1236, 1242-43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
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The appellate courts have almost uniformly remained true to their
tradition of applying chapter 39 as written and requiring the trial courts to
do so as well. The supreme court continues to arbitrate inconsistent
appellate rulings.
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